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ONWARD CONSTITUTIONAL SOLDIERS 
Milner S. Ball* 
CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH. By Sanford Levinson.** Princeton: 
Princeton University Press. · 1988. Pp. xii, 250. $19.95. 
We are unlikely to be given a more careful, thoughtful, and candid 
insider's account of the American "civil religion'~ 1 than Sanford Lev-
inson's Constitutional Faith, the fruit of a decade's reflection by a lead-
ing legal scholar.2 Much good can come of the constitutional religion. 
It may bind together diverse groups into one polity, for example, or 
may expand the polity's embrace of the dissentient, the disestablished, 
and the poor, as its heroes Abraham Lincoln and Martin Luther King, 
Jr. taught us. American civil religion has also a seldom-considered 
downside, however, revealed through its anti-heroes like Richard 
Nixon and Oliver North, that can issue in exclusion and division and 
uncritical obedience to the powers that be. Not the least strength of 
Levinson's study is its fr~nk examination of the disintegrating, frag-
menting potential that constitutional religion shares with all the 
"many fighting faiths."3 Religious ambiguity, tension, and division 
• Caldwell Professor of Constitutional Law, University of Georgia School of Law. A.B. 
1958, Princeton University; S.T.B. 1961, Harvard University; J.D. 1971, University of Georgia 
School of Law. - Ed. 
•• Charles Tilford McCormick Professor of Law, University of Texas School of Law. -Ed. 
1. Rousseau invented the phrase "civil religion" to describe the religion he believed necessary 
to a republic, concluding that Christianity would not serve this purpose. J. ROUSSEAU, THE 
SOCIAL CONTRACT 176-87 (M. Cranston trans. 1968). Debate about the existence and content of 
an American civil religion was precipitated by Bellah. See Civil Religion in America, in R. BEL-
LAH, BEYOND BELIEF: EssAYS ON RELIGION JN A Posr-TRADmONAL WORLD 168 (1970) 
(written for a 1966 conference). The American civil religion is said to be a set of religious sym-
bols and practices supporting political legitimacy and not fused with either church or state - a 
kind of worship of the republic or of a higher reality upholding the republic. It is prototypically 
expressed in presidential inaugural addresses with their predictable invocations of a nonpartisan, 
amorphous God. The courts, it has been proposed, are this religion's "new pulpits." Hammond, 
Pluralism and Law in the Formation of American Civil Religion, in VARIETIES OF CIVIL RELI-
GION 138, 161 (1980). 
Levinson describes his book as part of the "interest in civil religion" (p. 62), and relates how 
he signed onto a "limited constitutional faith" (p. 193). These self-descriptions coupled with the 
tenor of the book are my grounds for referring to it as an insider's account. Full disclosure 
compels that I note my unsympathetic regard for American civil religion. My misgivings about 
both American civil religion in particular and state Christianity in general are stated, among 
other places, in Ball, Cross and Sword, Victim and Law: A Tentative Response to Leonard Levy~ 
Treason Against God (Book Review), 35 STAN. L. REv. 1007, 1007-09, 1028-31 (1983); Ball, 
Obligation: Not to the Law But to the Neighbor, 18 GA. L. REv. 911, 919-27 (1984). Readers of 
this revi(!W may wish to take my preconceptions into account when considering both my positive 
assessment of Levinson's work and my criticism of it. 
2. See Levinson, "The Constitution" in American Civil Religion, 1979 SUP. CT. REV. 123. 
3. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
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compose the organizing principle of the book. 
The frontispiece is a telling cartoon. It depicts a stylized columnar 
swirl of robing from the top of which emerges the stovepipe-hatted 
head of Lincoln and his right hand with the index finger pointing sky-
ward toward the light. At the base, the enfolded head of Nixon scowls 
down at the darkness. The ~awing may be taken to suggest a weath-
ervane rotating vertically. With the political winds upwelling and 
blowing divinely, the American civil religion does· lift, inspire, en-
lighten - Lincoln ascendant. But as we and Levinson know only too 
well, winds shiftr 
Accordingly, when, in the last chapter, Levinson tells of adding his 
signature to the Constitution in a Philadelphia bicentennial exhibit -
personal testimony to acc~ptance of membership in the company of 
believers - he spc:;aks circumspectly, of "a limited constitutim)al faith" 
that commits him only to "a process of becoming and . . . to taking 
political conversation seriously" (p. 193). This is hardly the irrational, 
unseeing en'.thusias_m of the freshly born-again and for that reason, 
among ot:l~ers, ltj.s views will ~ely be found to bear weight. Even so, it 
is a religious commitment and for that rea~on should give pause to 
readers, especially those Levinson refers to as "more 'God-oriented' " 
than he.4 
I. LEVINSON'S DIALECTICS OF CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH 
Levinson draws categories from the theory and history of other 
religions to aid his explication of the American faith centered on the 
Constitution. 
A. Protestants and Catholics 
He begins by applying to constitutional faith's divisions over text 
and interpretation a typology informed by Protestant-Catholic dis-
putes about doctrinal authority (pp. 18-53). Protestants, in his 
scheme, take sacred teJ!:t as the source of authority. They are doubly 
protestant (his category of protestant-protestant) when they repose in-
terpretive authority in the individual, each believer reading and inter-
preting the Bible for herself. Catholics believe that it is not scripture 
4. I am not at all sure, but I think Levllison would consign me to the "more 'God-oriented' 
readers, with whom many of us do not identify .... " P. 56. My uncertainty arises from his 
description of such readers as "those who identify 'religious beliefs' as the knowable words (or 
commands) of a divine presence rather than either idiosyncratic metaphors concerning an ineffa-
ble mystery or, more likely, psychological or sociological projections of all-too-human anxieties 
or social structures." P. 56. I cannot locate myself within his unnecessarily limitea (and pejora-
tive?) range of alternatives. He seems to be unfamiliar with contemporary reflection upon and 
response to biblical critique of human religiousness. As Harvey Cox has noted, "religion is not 
always and everywhere a good thing," and those of us who attempt to understand the biblical 
sagas are hard-pressed to do so in a time "when the rebirth of religion, rather than its disappear-
ance, poses the most serious question." H. Cox, RELIGION IN THE SECULAR CITY: Tow ARD A 
POSTMODERN THEOLOGY 19-20 (1984). See also infra notes 21-23 and supra note 1. 
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alone but unwritten tradition and scripture that serve as the joint 
source of authority. They are catholic-catholic when the hierarchical, 
institutionalized Church rather than the individual has the decisive 
authority to interpret. 
Differentiating practitioners of constitutional faith according to 
this typology - instead of casting them as originalists/non-originalists 
or interpretivists/non-interpretivists - produces interesting results. 
Frederick Douglass and Ed Meese, who contrast in almost every other 
imaginable way, may be understood to share a protestant-protestant 
commitment to the validity of individual interpretation of the sacred 
text of the Constitution standing alone. Pitted against the protestant-
protestants are the catholic-catholics, like John Marshall Harlan, who 
take unwritten tradition together with the Constitution for their 
source and the Supreme Court for their authorized interpreter. In the 
fray in-between are protestant-catholics (Hugo Black and other believ-
ers in text and judicial supremacy in interpretation) and catholic-prot-
estants (Ronald Dworkin and those who believe in more than text and 
less than exclusive judicial supremacy) (pp. 51-52). 
The point of the exercise is not a new academic game of pin-the-
tag-on-the-believer but a demonstration of both the relevance of reli-
gious categories and the religious-like nature of the divisiveness in con-
stitutional theory as constitutional theology. 
B. Constitution and Morality 
Other religions confront the problem of theodicy, the problem of 
explaining evil in a world in which God is omnipotent and just. Does 
submission to God entail abandonment of human standards of good 
and evil? Is whatever God does good? Levinson identifies as a weaker 
version of this dilemma American civil religion's concern for relating 
the Constitution and morality: Can the order created out of citizens' 
submission to the Constitution claim to be just as well as powerful? Is 
whatever is constitutional good? 
Some constitutional commentators deemphasize or do not discern 
a difference between law and morality.5 One consequence of assuming 
a happy correlation of the American legal system with goodness and 
justice is to assure attorneys that they may take untroubled moral 
pride in the full range of their professional activities - the good law-
yer is the good person. 6 
Levinson credits the need to sanctify constitutional law in a diverse 
contemporary society that lacks a shared moral vision, for the Consti-
tution may be, after all, the only binding principle of order that re-
5. Levinson discusses Owen Fiss as an example of a commentator who deemphasizes the 
difference. Pp. 58-59. 
6. Charles Fried is discussed as an advocate of such a point of view. P. 167. 
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mains. Nevertheless - playing out his fundamental theme of religious 
ambiguity and disintegration - Levinson also cautions that constitu-
tional faith is "idolatrous if it leads its adherents to suspend their in-
dependent evaluation of the tenets of the faith" (p. 88). He describes 
without resolving the dilemma of a more-or-less necessary constitu-
tional fealty that inevitably becomes a self-destructive idolatry. 
C. Loyal Sheep and Questionable Goats 
Religious communities employ creedal affirmations to determine 
who is a member and who is not, who is orthodox and who unortho-
dox. This method of separating insiders from outsiders is characteris-
tic as well of the American civil religious community. The American 
creed7 is an instrument of inclusion when endorsement of it allows 
immigrants to be accepted as citizens, and it is an instrument of exclu-
sion when it serves as a benchmark for dividing true Americans from 
un-Americans, real from false patriots (pp. 94-99). 
In performing this basic sorting function, American creedalism, 
according to Levinson, creates a constellation of problems or tensions. 
One not fully addressed by the traditional learning is that of the con-
flict or hierarchy of attachments (pp. 122-54). Loyalty oaths of the 
typ€? required of many officeholders and public employees raise the 
question of exclusivity of attachment: supreme loyalty is sworn to the 
Constitution (or country), but American citizens have multiple loyal-
ties to other political entities, to other institutions, to other religious 
communities, any of which may legitimately claim supremacy. What 
does it mean, then, to require a pledge of allegiance to the United 
States? Is this to insist on primary loyalty to Constitution, nation, or 
flag over loyalty to family and religion? The dilemma is typically 
glossed over rather than confronted or resolved or acknowledged. 
A second ambiguity of attachment raised by subscription to the 
American creed is one of content. If we profess supreme loyalty to the 
Constitution, what Constitution are we agreeing to become attached to 
and by which tokens of allegiance? Levinson draws again upon forms 
of religious thought to illuminate the question. 
In the Jewish and Christian traditions, a distinction is sometimes 
made between revelatory events and the texts that bear witness to 
them, between the acts of God and the biblical stories about them. A 
similar distinction can be drawn in the American civil religion be-
tween the sacred events and the sacred texts. Which then is the object 
of reverence - the revolutionary, law-breaking acts of the beginning 
or the culminating Philadelphia text? Do we venerate the idol-smash-
7. The notion of an "American creed" is attributed to Samuel Huntington and is described as 
"a set of overt political commitments that includes an emphasis on individual rights, majority 
rule, and a constitutional order limiting governmental power." P. 95. 
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ing or idolize the Constitution? And what form does our devotion 
take - inner adoration or outward compliance, faith or good works? 
Levinson explores two examples of the ambiguities of constitu-
tional attachment. The first is Schneiderman v. United States, 8 in 
which the Supreme Court was confronted with the problem of identi-
fying the Constitution it was to interpret. When he had become a nat-
uralized citizen, Schneiderman claimed both that he behaved as one 
attached to the Constitution and that he was a Communist party 
member. Some years later the United States sought to set aside his 
citizenship as illegally procured. Was internal, mental disposition or 
external, observed behavior to be the accepted manifestation of attach-
ment to the Constitution? A devoted Communist may be an out-
wardly law-abiding citizen for a variety of reasons, including 
prudential calculation about what is possible in the meantime before 
the government can be successfully overthrown. Correspondingly, 
persons firmly attached to the principles of the American creed may 
act illegally, out of the most American of motives and after the fashion 
of the founders. Which is the truer: doing what the founders did or 
what they wrote? Then, too, is a Communist program of the dictator-
ship of the proletariat totally incongruent with constitutional commit-
ment to a federal republic governed by the people? 
In Schneiderman the Court punted. It did not approve Schneider-
man's position but set a high standard of proof for removal of citizen-
ship and held that the government had failed to meet it in its attempt 
to show absence of constitutional attachment.9 
The other example of the problems of constitutional attachment is 
Abraham Lincoln's combination of reverence for law and indifference 
to legal niceties (suspension of habeas corpus, military arrest). To 
Levinson, Lincoln is the incarnation of the tension between nationally 
responsible and constitutionally faithful action. It may be easier, he 
observes, "to reinterpret the Constitution to be congruent with Lin-
coln's actions" than to interpret the actions into congruence with the 
Constitution, but "such reinterpretation ... raise[ s] the possibility that 
we may have 'many Constitutions,' " requiring that we "decide which 
Constitution garnered Lincoln's attachment and which, in turn, de-
serves our own."10 
D. I Believe, Help My Unbelief 
The book concludes with two chapters of honest, more directly 
personal assessment of belief and practice in the American civil reli-
gion. Levinson addresses the question of what it means to be a profes-
8. 320 U.S. 118 (1943). The discussion begins at p. 126. 
9. 320 U.S. at 154. See p. 126. 
10. P. 141. Levinson says he borrowed the "many Constitutions" passage from Che 
Guevara. Id. 
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sor of constitutional law in the legal academy - what it means, in his 
terms, to profess the constitutional faith to its future professional prac-
titioners (pp. 155-79). 
The issue has been given some currency by in-house tempests 
about whether members of the Critical Legal Studies movement 
should be allowed on law school faculties. Levinson frames the issue 
in religious terms of the sort employed throughout the book: whether 
law schools are either divinity schools or schools of religion, whether 
Crits are atheists and blasphemers, and whether, if they are blasphem-
ers, they should be admitted to law faculties. 
After a balanced consideration of the conflicting possibilities, Lev-
inson confesses to personal beliefs that are liberal (as opposed to illib-
eral, not as opposed to conservative, i.e., not in the sense of George 
Bush's demagogic talk about the "L word"). The law school is to him 
less divinity school than "department of religion" where law "always 
remains worthy of our study" althqugh it may be "unworthy of our 
faith" (p. 179). Levinson would admit the Crits. At least he says he 
would admit the Schneidermans of the world were they to apply for 
faculty positions. However, the issue of tests of faith for teachers of 
the young·- identifying Schneidermans and Crits, doubters and here-
tics, and determining their status - cannot be resolved by "cold logic 
and analysis" (p. 179). It requires that we "choose between two fun-
damentally different cultural visions of legal study. A leap must be 
made, whether of faith or of something else" (p. 179). 
Levinson ends with the confession of his own choice by telling the 
story of his Philadelphia experience and the struggle in his heart when 
he found himself in the Second Bank of the United States before the 
National Park Service bicentennial exhibit, "Miracle in Philadelphia," 
confronted, with every other tourist-become-pilgrim, by two endless 
scrolls and the question of whether to add his name to the foot of the 
Constitution (pp.· 180-94). He relates how his hand was finally com-
pelled to move by "the memory of Frederick Douglass and his willing-
ness to embrace the Constitution" (p. 192). Levinson testifies that jn 
giving his signature he yielded the "sign of our willingness to join in 
affirming a 'constitutional faith,' whatever the attendant difficulties in 
giving content to the notion" (p. 181) and whatever the accompanying 
qualifications and reservations. 
IJ. RELIGION OR JUST RHETORIC AND AMAZING GRACE? 
This is a fine volume. It deserves and will command a good audi-
ence. No summ~ry can capture the subtleties in which its successes 
reside. Levinson is deeply, winsomely committed to dialogue and in-
vites readers to engage in it, with him (p. 8). I shall be understood to 
accept his invitation and to authenticate my positive, tributary assess-
ment of his book if I raise a question about his enterprise. 
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The American civil religion is shot through with ambiguities, and 
Levinson succeeds in describing them. He also succeeds in honestly 
revealing his own ambivalence as an adherent of the faith, one who is a 
thinking, tolerant practitioner with a firm grasp of the limits of the 
belief, one who cautions against the idolatry of unqualified constitu-
tional faith. 
In addition to the intentionally addressed ambiguities of the object 
studied and the studying subject there is a further and nondeliberate 
ambiguity running through Levinson's book. His talk of an American 
civil religion, which has the Constitution for its central sacred text, is 
variously and irreconcilably metaphorical, analogical, and factual talk. 
The title Constitutional Faith seems to be a metaphor, and Levinson 
frequently employs it or specifically identifies it as such. 11 With equal 
frequency, however, he treats or specifically characterizes the relation 
between law and religion as one of analogy, 12 and he draws on the 
concepts and history of religion to compare them - analogize them 
- to secular American constitutional law. At other times "constitu-
tional faith," "American civil religion," and "American faith commu-
nity" appear as statements of fact and not as statements of analogy or 
metaphor. 13 
An analogy starts from the premise of difference between two 
things compared and suggests possible likenesses across the gulf of 
their difference; it is the statement of an equivocal relation. A meta-
phor, on the other hand, starts from the premise that the thing said 
and the thing meant share at some fundamental level an identity that 
happens in the metaphor; it realizes a univocal relation. Finally, a 
statement of fact is a statement of identity and not of relation. 
Constitutional faith has one set of implications and claims if it is an 
analogy, another if it is a metaphor. The implications and claims grow 
in complexity and become wholly unacceptable if constitutional faith 
is a statement of fact. 
Levinson says he would not be surprised "if many readers felt in-
tense disquiet at the implication of the analogy between law and reli-
gion that is the foundation of this book" (p. 121). I do not think any 
reader will be disquieted by the implications of the analogy. Analogies 
are the common currency of teachers. If they work and provide in-
struction - this one does both - then the execution gives pleasure. 
Of course the content of the instruction provided can be troubling 
(e.g., American treatment of Native Americans is like genocide). But 
where does trouble arise from saying that American politics is like 
religion, that respecting and interpreting the Constitution is like re-
11. E.g., pp. 15-16, 158-59, 194. 
12. E.g., pp. 16-17, 27, 36, 59, 121. 
13. E.g., pp. 51-52, 93-94, 96, 180, 193. 
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specting and interpreting a sacred text, that social disintegration is like 
sectarian disintegration? 
On the other hand, one might feel some disquiet about the implica-
tions if constitutional faith is a metaphor. Readers might experience 
enough of a shock of recognition to rethink the relative importance of 
rendering dues to Caesar and to God. Generally, however, a meta-
phor's power - of whatever kind, whether to unsettle or inspire or 
startle or delight - depends upon the distance between the thing said 
and the thing meant: the further apart, the greater the power (the 
swimming fish is a grey, monotonous soul; the encampment of the 
poor on the D.C. Mall is Resurrection City). My own sense is that 
belief in American constitutional government and religious belief (love 
of country and love of God) are generally regarded as so close together 
("for God, for country, and for Yale") that many readers will not feel 
intense disquiet at constitutional faith as metaphor and its 
implications.14 . 
But constitutional faith as a statement of fact should cause alarm. 
The Constitution was the invention of men of the eighteenth century. 
"There is no ultimate mystery in what the Constitution is about, at 
least for those who accept [the] premise that [the world] is in principle 
subject to human understanding. It is this secularist premise that 
makes constitutional interpretation, for all its complexities, something 
fundamentally different from the interpretation of a scripture .... " 15 
The Constitution is an artifact. To worship it is idolatry plain and 
simple. 
Levinson cites the contention of Justice Brennan, a Roman Catho-
lic, that he had settled in his mind to undertake "an obligation under 
the Constitution which could not be influenced by any of my religious 
principles. . . . [T]o the extent [Roman Catholic belief] conflicts with 
what I think the Constitution means or requires, then my religious 
beliefs have to give way" (p. 56). Certainly this statement of subordi-
nation of Christian to constitutional faith must be taken seriously. 
Without more it is troubling, even shocking. Does it have any more 
than face value as a ·confessed privileging of constitutional faith, as 
idolatry? · 
The author notes that, especially for Roman Catholic candidates 
for the Supreme Court, the confirmation process has been a degrading 
ceremony (owing presumably to majoritarian suspicion or prejudice) 
(p. 56). Is it in this light that Brennan's .1956, pre-President Kennedy 
belief is to be understood? Does it belong to a type of concession 
wrung by an orthodox majority -from a minority of believers? 
14. I itch whenever Levinson shifts from analogy to metaphor and/or fact but am uncertain 
how many others will share my ,need to scratch. 
15. Grey, The Constitution as Scripture, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1, 16-17 (1984) (footnote 
omitted). 
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May the statement be seen in the interpretive context of Brennan's 
life as a judge, the history of his work on the Court? Is there to be 
discerned in his record the work of a Christian infidel? His is not the 
story of a judge who set aside one faith to serve the oppressive, nation-
alist institutions of another. For this reason, it is misleading for Levin-
son to strip the statement of its post-Holocaust, post-Brown, Brennan-
Court context and to describe it as an echo of Justice Story's apologia 
for an opinion supporting slavery: "I shall never hesitate to do my 
duty as a Judge,.under the Constitution and laws of the United States, 
be the consequences what they may" (p. 56). Brennan was not puffing 
judicial duty as an excuse for ducking out on the oppressed. 
There is a related inattention to context in Levinson's use of the 
statement - pivotal to him - made oy Representative Barbara Jor-
dan in the Watergate/impeachment hearings: "My faith in the Con-
stitution is whole. It is complete. It is total" (p. 15). This is political 
rhetoric, not religious confession. Jordan certainly intended to high-
light the special relationship between herself as a black woman and the 
Constitution withirt whose protection she had "finally been 
included."16 
Jordan drew attention to the rhetorical character of her comments 
both directly ("I believe hyperbole would not be fictional ... 1' 17) and 
indirectly. L.H. LaRue correctly notes that her rhetorical technique 
"came down to the contrast between the nobility of her language (both 
her own and that which she quoted) and the actuality of Nixon's con-
duct."18 To her own constitutional faithfulness and that of others, she 
juxtaposed Nixon's failure in the constitutionally charged "task of tak-
ing care that the laws befaithfully executed."19 Nixon committed an 
impeachable offense, not apostasy or heresy. And Jordan was employ-
ing the exceptional political rhetoric demanded by so extreme an 
occasion. 
Much the same thing needs to be said about Douglass, whose ex-
ample has also exerted great influence on Levinson. Douglass was 
animated by the urgent need to end slavery. He broke with the Gar-
risonians when he concluded that dissolution of the Union would only 
leave the institution of slavery intact in the southern states. To uphold 
the Union, he had to uphold the Constitution. To uphold the Consti-
tution, he had to argue it as an anti-slavery document, which he did 
with remarkable skill and tenacity. His example is deeply but not re-
ligiously affecting. Douglass' embrace of the Constitution was an ex-
ercise in prudential politics and rhetoric rather than religion. 
16. L. LARUE, POLITICAL DISCOURSE: A CASE STUDY OF THE WATERGATE AFFAIR 116 
(1988). For the entire speech, see id. at 116-20. 
17. Id. at 117. 
18. Id. 
19. Id. at 120 (emphasis added). 
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Granted "that constitutionalist discourse can be a valuable way of 
addressing crucial public issues" (p. 191), why transmute or transub-
stantiate the usefulness and, perhaps, necessity of constitutional rheto-
ric into constitutional religion? Briefs, lawbooks and the other media 
of constitutional talk are not sacramental tokens. There may be an 
analogy here but not a free-wheeling metaphor and certainly not a 
fact. 
Levinson's undifferentiating use of analogy, metaphor, and fact in 
discussion of constitutional faith arises from irresolution about his 
commitment to it. He wants it both ways, wants both his religion and 
his secular rhetoric at the same time., He is a self-confessed if circum-
spect member of the - stated as fact - "American faith community" 
(p. 193). He knows there must be more, an outside basis for judgment, 
but lacks the discourse and distance of genuine transcendence. One 
foot is planted in constitutional faith. The other uncertainly tests the 
empty air around it for a necessary, unlocated foothold. 
What beyond AJfierican faith guides him and can preserve him 
from th~ idolatry he warns against? What provides him with a basis 
for sensing the ambiguities and limits of constitutional faith and for 
evaluating them? What lies outside the American civil religion to in-
form his reservations about it? The engaging clarity of Levinson's ex-
position of constitutional faith does not extend to the spare hints at an 
apparently essential faith beyond constitutional faith. 
Important to his teaching (professing) of law, Levinson says, is the 
attempt "to prevent the deification of positive law at the cost of recog-
nition of one's membership in the broader human community" (p. 
169). Alternatively, he says that he opposes socializing his students 
"in unstinting respect for law" and so insists on making them aware 
"that disobedience to the commands of the law may on occasion be 
required of someone committed to self-respect and the respect of other 
morally admirable people" (p. 170). Is membership "in the broader 
human community" or "self-respect" or "respect for other morally ad-
mirable people" the more transcendent commitment that allows for 
evaluation of the less transcendent constitutional faith? What is its 
content? By what criteria are we to identify the others who are, like 
the self, morally admirable? Why have regard for the morally admira-
ble only and not also for. sinners? Is the judging self the standard of 
judgment? Is there not grave danger here of solipsism or ethnocen-
trism or nationalism? 
Levinson notes how little it surprises that he, "a white, male, well-
paid law professor," would become a born-again constitutional be-
liever, and he understands how others might well have greeted the 
bicentennial with rage (p. 193). He therefore concludes that "[t]he 
vital challenge facing the American faith community is the possibility 
of expanding the relevant 'we' in 'We the People,' who must ultimately 
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endorse the faith if it is to live as anything other than an ideological 
charade" (p. 193). The point is well taken but not preemptive. Is the 
best or most vital or only thing to expand the "we"? To write "I" ever 
larger? Is it not one of the problems that we can only think of writing 
the "I" larger, expanding an "us" to include a "them"? 
If nothing else, the presence of Native Americans is a continuing 
reminder that there are on this continent other political realities older 
than the constitutional one. There are people here who want no part 
in "We the People," who want only that "we" acknowledge the integ-
rity of their life and their tribal way and that we suspend our aggres-
sive belief- oppressive tq them and self-destructive to us - that the 
Constitution is the supreme (only, transcendent) law of the land. 
Levinson disclaims having written a book of moral philosophy and 
seeks to avoid misunderstanding by explaining that his use of the 
phrase "moral seriousness" does not imply any form of absolute or 
revealed moral grounding and connotes instead "the evaluation of 
one's actions or intellectual positions in terms of the welfare of others 
•••• " 20 Nevertheless, Constitutional Faith is a book of religion. Lev-
inson is impressively aware of the controversial nature of assertions of 
the supremacy of this religion. He cautions against the faithful aban-
doning "their independent evaluation of the tenets of the faith" (p. 
88). But how are they to do so? What is the basis and content of their 
independent evaluation? What are "terms of the welfare of others"? 
How are they to achieve the terms or the welfare? 
Having squarely raised the religious issue with this noteworthy 
book and having lent to American civil religion the weight of his 
(qualified) willingness to profess it - the more weighty because the 
more carefully considered - Levinson should have explained or at 
least indicated what keeps this religion in perspective for him and 
what might do so for others. If not the biblical stories, then what? 
If the legal academy continues to entertain the idea that its subject 
is religion as a matter of fact or of metaphor, then, sooner or later, it 
must come to terms with Karl Barth's insight, central to his theology, 
that religion is a form of unbelief.21 Levinson says "[w]hether consti-
tutional faith maintains itself depends on our ability to continue taking 
it seriously" (p. 194). I think its maintenance depends on our taking it 
less seriously, i.e., either from the distance that comes with the stance 
20. P. 57 n.•. 
21. The point is specifically made at 3 K. BARTH, CHURCH DOGMATICS pt. 4, 479 (Mackay, 
Parker, Knight, Kennedy & Marks trans. 1961), and is systematically treated in 1 id., pt. 2, at 
280-361 (Thomas & Knight trans. 1956). It also lies at the heart of Barth's famous, fateful THE 
EPISTLE TO THE ROMANS (E. Hoskyns trans. 1933). The distinction between religion and reli-
gious practices, on the one hand, and, on the other, the biblical stories and theology is also drawn 
by, among others, Dietrich Bonhoeffer. See D. BONHOEFFER, LETTERS AND p APERS FROM 
PRISON 262, 361, 381 (E. Bethge ed. 1971); M. BALL, LYING DOWN TOGETHER: LAW, META-
PHOR, AND THEOLOGY 181-85 nn.15-17, 186-88 n.32 (1985). 
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of the outsider22 or from the critical, comic distance that comes with 
recognition that American civil religion is unbelief. 23 
22. See W. STRINGFELLOW, AN ETHIC FOR CHRISTIANS AND OTHER ALIENS IN A 
STRANGE LAND (1973); W. STRINGFELLOW, CONSCIENCE AND OBEDIENCE: THE POLITICS OF 
ROMANS 13 AND REVELATION 13 IN LIGHT OF THE SECOND COMING (1977). 
23. Those seized of genuine belief may find that different contexts require different responses 
to the demanded tokens of civil religion. Dietrich Bonhoeffer, the German theologian eventually 
arrested and killed by the Nazis, 
had been eagerly on the watch for people who could summon up the courage to say No 
publicly, and were willing to accept dismissal from their posts in consequence. There now 
came a period [after frustration of the first anti-Hitler conspiracy] when it was of the utmost 
importance that people of character should remain at the controls in all circumstances and 
not allow themselves to be displaced. That meant that what had hitherto been a question of 
character now became a mere bagatelle - a greeting with the Hitler salute, for instance. 
Instead of refusing this, one had to see that it meant nothing if by it one could get into 
key positions. That meant that the use of camouflage became a moral duty. 
E. BETHGE, DIETRICH BONHOEFFER 532 (Mosbacher, Ross, Clarke & Glen-Doepel trans. 1970). 
For the faithfully nonreligious to employ the indicia of civil religion as camouflage requires both 
ethical agility and confidence in forgiveness. 
